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THE SUPREME COURT ADDS NEW
GUIDELINES ON "SERVICE CONNECTION"
IN DETERMINING COURT-MARTIAL
JURISDICTION
MERLE F. WILBERDING*
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the military justice system has received an exceptional
amount of discussion in both the courts and the legal periodicals.' The
cumulative effect of this expanded and prolonged examination of justice
in the military has produced marked differences and improvements in
the system.2 In June of 1969, the Supreme Court decided O'Callahan v.
Parker,3 and thereby rocked the very foundation of court-martial
jurisdiction. Under that holding, a military court-martial had no
jurisdiction to try a serviceman for a crime which occurred off-post,
during off-duty hours, while he was on leave with an evening pass, and
while he was in civilian clothing.4 In summary, Mr. Justice Douglas,
writing for a 5-3 majority, concluded that courts-martial lacked
* Captain, JAGC, U.S. Army; Government Appellate Division, U.S. Army Judiciary
Headquarters, Washington, D.C. The opinions and conclusions presented herein are those of the
author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Judge Advocate General, the United States
Army, or any other governmental agency.
1. See, e.g., O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969); Everett, O'Callahan v.
Parker-Milestone or Millstone for Military Justice?. 1969 DUKE L.J. 835; Kester, Soldiers Who
Insult the President: An Uneasy Look at Article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 8 1
HARV, L. REV. 1697 (1968); Nelson & Westbrook, Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Servicemen for
"Civilian Offenses": An Analysis of O'Callahan v. Parker, 54 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1969); Rice,
O'Callahan v. Parker: Court-Martial Jurisdiction. "Service Connection," Confusion and the
Serviceman, 51 MIL. L. REV. 41 (1970); Weiner, Are the General Military Articles
Unconstitutionally Vague?, 54 A.B.A.J. 357 (1968); Wurtzel, O'Callahan v. Parker: Where Are We
Now?, 56 A.B.A.J. 686 (1970); Note, Civilian Court Review of Courts-Martial Adjudications, 69
COLUM. L. REV. 1259 (1969); Note, Servicemen in Civilian Courts, 76 YALE L.J. 380 (1966).
2. For a complete analysis of the changes and improvements, compare MANUAL FOR COURTS-
MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (195 1) with MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (1969) and
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL. UNITED STATES (Rev. ed. 1969).
3. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969). There, Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for a
majority of the Supreme Court, concluded that "the crime to be under military jurisdiction must be
service connected, lest 'cases arising in the land or naval forces or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of war or public danger,' as used in the Fifth Amendment, be expanded to deprive
every member of the armed services of the benefits of an indictment by a grand jury and a trial by a
jury of his peers." Id. at 272-73.
4. Id. at 259-60.
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jurisdiction to try servicemen, on active duty, for offenses which had no
"service connection". 5 The underlying reasons for the O'Callahan
decision were given as a constitutional interpretation that the result was
necessary to preserve (a) grand jury indictments and (b) trial by peers.'
The Supreme Court's pronouncement in O'Callahan of a "service
connection" standard to be used in determining court-martial
jurisdiction necessarily evoked a substantial amount of uncertainty as to
its full meaning and extent. The military appellate courts immediately
began their task of applying that standard to a great variety of factual
situations. Yet, the ad hoc standard of O'Callahan needed further
examination by the Supreme Court so that the Court could better
explain the meaning of "service connection". New guidelines were
necessary to provide additional insight into the meaning of O'Callahan.
On February 25, 1971-almost two years after the O'Callahan
decision-the Supreme Court decided Relford v. Commandant, U.S.
Disciplinary Barracks,7 which has added new dimensions in determining
the scope of court-martial jurisdiction. However, to understand better
the effects and implications of Relford, it is necessary first to examine
the pre-Relford scope of O'Callahan as developed by the military
appellate courts.
II. THE MILITARY'S APPLICATION OF O'Callahan
While the Supreme Court had said that "service connection" was a
prerequisite to military jurisdiction, it was the initial task of the United
States Court of Military Appeals to implement that standard and
establish guidelines for the individual judge advocate to apply it
correctly to specific factual situations. This necessarily required an ad
hoc construction of rules which more clearly defined areas of court-
martial jurisdiction.
The highest military court first considered the O'Callahan decision in
United States v. Borys.8 Borys had been convicted of various and sundry
sex offenses, robbery, and attempts thereof. All were committed off-post
and while he was off-duty or on leave; in addition, Borys was in civilian
clothing and his victims were civilians. The only military connection was
5. Id. at 272-73.
6. Id. Perhaps the true reason was predicated on Mr. Justice Douglas' belief that a court-martial
is not an independent judicial system, but instead, a part of military discipline. For example, he
stated that "[w]hile the Court of Military Appeals takes cognizance of some constitutional rights of
the accused who are court-martialed, courts-martial as an institution are singularly inept in dealing
with the nice subtleties of constitutional law." Id. at 265.
7. 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
8. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 547,40 C.M.R. 259 (1969).
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his military status as an Army Officer. Moreover, all the offenses were
cognizable in the civilian criminal courts. Based upon these facts, the
court concluded that the offenses were not "service connected" and that
the military had no jurisdiction. 9
In little more than a year, the Court of Military Appeals distilled the
O'Callahan and Borys decisions and indicated some definite areas in
which O'Callahan had no limiting effect-in other words, some areas in
which the military still had proper court-martial jurisdiction. 0 This
judicial process resulted in the following areas in which, according to the
Court of Military Appeals, a court-martial can still legitimately assume
jurisdiction.
a. On Base or Military Reservation. The first area was over those
offenses which are committed on base or on a military reservation."
Relying on the duty of the military to maintain the security of the
military posts, the court consistently held that that factor alone was
sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the court-martial. 12 Under this line of
cases, as long as the offense was perpetrated on-post, the court has
upheld jurisdiction over robbery off-post where the assault and force
elements occurred on-post, 13 murder," bad checks uttered 5 on base, 6 sex
9. Id. at 549, 40 C.M.R. at 261. See also United States v. Armstrong, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 5, 41
C.M.R. 5 (1969); United States v. Prather, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 560, 40 C.M.R. 272 (1969); United
States v. Chandler, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 593, 40 C.M.R. 305 (1969); United States v. Crapo, 18
U.S.C.M.A. 594,40 C.M.R. 306 (1969); United States v. Riehle, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 603,40 C.M.R.
315 (1969).
10. See also Wurtzel, O'Callahan v. Parker: Where Are We Now?, 56 A.B.A.J. 686 (1970).
II. See, e.g., United States v. Crapo, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 594,40 C.M.R. 306 (1969); United States
v. Williams, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 605,40 C.M.R. 317 (1969); United States v. Paxiao, 18 U.S.C.M.A.
608, 40 C.M.R. 320 (1969); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 609, 40 C.M.R. 321 (1969);
United States v. Schockley, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 610, 40 C.M.R. 322 (1969). The issue of whether the
military has jurisdiction for kidnapping and rape which occurred on-post and for an offense
perpetrated by a serviceman against a civilian on-post was recently decided in the affirmative by the
United States Supreme Court, Relford v. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, 401 U.S. 355
(1971).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Crapo, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 594,40 C.M.R. 306 (1969); United States
v. Williams, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 605,40 C.M.R. 317 (1969); United States v. Paxiao, 18 U.S.C.M.A.
608, 40 C.M.R. 320 (1969); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 609, 40 C.M.R. 321 (1969);
United States v. Schockley, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 610, 40 C.M.R. 322 (1969).
13. United States v. Crapo, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 594,40 C.M.R. 306 (1969).
14. United States v. Allen, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 31,41 C.M.R. 31 (1969); United States v. Fields, 19
U.S.C.M.A. 119,41 C.M.R. 119 (1969).
15. "'[U]ttering' and 'delivering' have similar meanings. Both 'uttering' and 'delivering' mean
transferring the instrument to another, but 'uttering' has the additional meaning of offering to
transfer." MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES 202A (Rev. ed. 1969); See also
UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 123a; United States v. Jackson, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 66, 32
C.M.R. 66 (1962), United States v. Davis, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 576, 31 C.M.R. 162 (1961).
16. United States v. Williams, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 605,40 C.M.R. 317 (1969).
Vol. 1971:413]
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offenses committed in government housing, 7 marijuana, 8 and wrongful
appropriation of a truck which was parked on a military reservation."
But there was held to be an insufficient connection if a car was stolen off-
post and subsequently brought on-post.2" In that case, United States v.
Riehle,21 Judge Ferguson stated in dicta that the court was taking no
position on whether a court-martial could try the accused for bringing
stolen property onto a military base. 22
b. Status of Victim. The second major limitation on O'Callahan's
effect was applied to cases in which the victim was a fellow
serviceman 23 -and this was true whether or not the perpetrator was
aware of the victim's status. 24 In establishing this "service connection",
Judge Darden relied on two footnotes in O'Callahan which indicated
that offenses committed upon fellow soldiers are "peculiarly military
crimes". 25 Judge Ferguson vigorously opposed this view, believing that
status alone was "too slender a nexus". 2 But the view of Judges Darden
and Quinn remained the law of the court.2 1
17. E.g.. carnal knowledge, United States v. Smith, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 609, 40 C.M.R. 321 (1969);
sodomy, United States v. Schockley, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 610,40 C.M.R. 322 (1969).
18. United States v. Rose, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 41 C.M.R. 3 (1969); United States v. Becker, 18
U.S.C.M.A. 563, 40 C.M.R. 275 (1969). Narcotic offenses, clearly within the ambit of court-
martial jurisdiction if committed on-post, are also within the purview of court-martial jurisdiction
off-post. See text accompanying notes 40-42 infra.
19. United States v. Paxiao, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 608,40 C.M.R. 320 (1969).
20. United States v. Riehle, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 603,40 C.M.R. 315 (1969). "When the automobile
was taken from the used car lot, the crime of larceny was complete and jurisdiction was thereupon
vested in the local courts." Id. at 604. Consistent with this theory was United States v. Wills, 20
U.S.C.M.A. 8, 42 C.M.R. 200 (1970), in which the court held that there was no court-martial
jurisdiction for the offense of interstate transportation of an automobile, even though the car was
stolen on-post, the charged offense did not occur on-post. In Wills, the court expressly overruled its
earlier view that the accused stole the car on a military reservation was a sufficient "service con-
nection" to sustain court-martial jurisdiction over the offense of interstate transportation of stolen
property, Swisher v. United States, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 624,41 C.M.R. 624 (1969).
21. United States v. Riehle, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 603,40 C.M.R. 315 (1969).
22. Id. at 604,40 C.M.R. at 316.
23. See, e.g., United States v. Lovejoy, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 18,42 C.M.R. 210 (1970); United States
v. Rego, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 9,41 C.M.R. 9 (1969); United States v. Camacho, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 11, 41
C.M.R. 11 (1969); United States v. Cook, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 13,41 C.M.R. 13 (1969); United States
v. Plamondon, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 22,41 C.M.R. 2-2 (1969); United States v. Nichols, 19 U.S.C.M.A.
43,41 C.M.R. 43 (1969); United States v. Everson, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 70,41 C.M.R. 70 (1969).
24. Compare United States v. Rego, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 9,41 C.M.R. 9 (1969), with United States
v. Camacho, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 11,41 C.M.R. 11 (1969).
25. United States v. Rego, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 9, 9-10, 41 C.M.R. 9, 9-10 (1969). See also
O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 270 n. 14, 274 n. 19 (1969).
26. United States v. Camacho, 19 U.S.CM.A. 11, 12,41 C.M.R. II, 12 (1969).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Lovejoy, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 18,42 C.M.R. 210 (1970); United States
v. Rego, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 9,41 C.M.R. 9 (1969); United States v. Camacho, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 11, 41
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss3/3
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It must be remembered, however, that while the status of the victim as
a serviceman has been sufficient, if the victim's status is a dependent"8 or
even a retired military person working on a base, 2 it has been
insufficient to sustain military jurisdiction.
c. Overseas. A third area in which the otherwise limiting effect of
O'Callahan has been restricted pertains to those offenses which occur
overseas. Judge Ferguson, speaking for the court in United States v.
Keaton30 held that O'Callahan does not apply "outside the territorial
limits of the United States. ' 31 The reason, of course, is that the foreign
countries' courts did not guarantee a grand jury indictment or a trial by
peers.3 2 Thus, the court's decisions made clear that O'Callahan had no
effect on offenses committed in Germany,3 the Philippines,3 Okinawa,3
and, presumably, Vietnam.
d. Exploitation or Reliance on Military Status. A fourth area in
which the court ruled that a court-martial had jurisdiction, not-
withstanding O'Callahan, includes situations in which the accused has
exploited his military status or caused others to rely on his status as a
basis in affording him the opportunity to commit the crime. For
example, in United States v. Peak,3 the accused was dressed in his
military uniform when he went to a used car lot. After identifying
himself and his unit, he convinced the salesman to let him test drive a
car. He never returned. The court held that this was a sufficient abuse of
C.M.R. 11 (1969); United States v. Cook, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 13,41 C.M.R. 13 (1969); United States
v. Plamondon, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 22, 41 C.M.R. 22 (1969); United States v. Nichols, 19 U.S.C.M.A.
43,41 C.M.R. 43 (1969); United States v. Everson, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 70,41 C.M.R. 70 (1969).
28. United States v. Henderson, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 601, 40 C.M.R. 313 (1969); United States v.
McGonigal, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 94,41 C.M.R. 94 (1969); United States v. Schockley, 18 U.S.C.M.A.
610,40 C.M.R. 322 (1969). For a discussion of the effect of the Relford decision on this line of cases
see text accompanying notes 71 and 106 infra.
29. United States v. Armes, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 15,41 C.M.R. 15 (1969).
30. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 64, 41 C.M.R. 64 (1969); see also United States v. Ortiz, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 21,
42 C.M.R. 213 (1970); United States v. Weinstein, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 29, 41 C.M.R. 29 (1969);
United States v. Easter, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 68, 41 C.M.R. 68 (1969); United States v. Stevenson, 19
U.S.C.M.A. 69,41 C.M.R. 69 (1969); United States v. Bryan, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 184,41 C.M.R. 184
(1969).
31. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 64 at 68,41 C.M.R. 64 at 68.
32. Id. at 67,41 C.M.R. at 67.
33. United States v. Weinstein, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 29, 41 C.M.R. 29 (1969); United States v.
Easter, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 68,41 C.M.R. 68 (1969); United States v. Stevenson, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 69,41
C.M.R. 69 (1969); United States v. Bryan, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 184,41 C.M.R. 184 (1969).
34. United States v. Keaton, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 64,41 C.M.R. 64 (1969).
35. United States v. Ortiz, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 21,42 C.M.R. 213 (1970).
36. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 19,41 C.M.R. 19 (1969). See also United States v. Fryman, 19 U.S.C.M.A.
71,41 C.M.R. 71 (1969).
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military status to merit a service connection.37 Judge Ferguson strongly
dissented, believing that the mere fact that the accused was wearing his
military fatigues was insufficient to clothe the court-martial with
jurisdiction. 3 Another common instance is a situation in which an
individual uses his military I.D. to cause the victim to rely on his
military status as a basis for cashing checks or other negotiable
instruments. 9 The cases seem to indicate clearly that anytime an
individual uses his military status-by I.D. card, uniform, or oral
identification-to facilitate the commission of an offense, the individual
thereby forms the requisite "service connection" necessary to sustain
court-martial jurisdiction.
e. Narcotics and Drug Offenses. The fifth specific area in which
court-martial jurisdiction was retained, notwithstanding O'Callahan,
was in the area of narcotics and marihuana. The cases of the Court of
Military Appeals in the first post-O'Callahan year clearly established
that it made no difference whether the offense was committed on or off-
post. 4 The reason for the inclusion of off-post activities was the special
detrimental significance that drugs have on the health, morale and
fitness for duty.41 Up until the present time, for purposes of determining
jurisdiction, it has made no difference whether the offense was use,
possession, sale or introduction. But in a case in which a serviceman
made an off-post sale of marihuana and LSD to a civilian, the court
concluded that the nexus was insufficient and that the court-martial had
no jurisdiction for lack of a "service connection". 41
f. National Defense Matters. The sixth O'Callahan exception
37. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 19 at 20-21,41 C.M.R. 19 at 20-21.
38. Id. at 21,41 C.M.R. at 21.
39. United States v. Frazier, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 40, 41 C.M.R. 40 (1969); United States v.
Hallahan, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 46, 41 C.M.R. 46 (1969); cf. United States v. Haagenson, 19
U.S.C.M.A. 332, 41 C.M.R. 332 (1970); United States v. Peterson, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 319, 41
C.M.R. 319 (1970). United States v. Morisseau, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 17,41 C.M.R. 17 (1969).
40. United States v. Beeker, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 563, 40 C.M.R. 275 (1969); United States v.
Castro, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 398, 40 C.M.R. 318 (1969); United States v. Rose, 19 U.S.CM.A. 3,41
C.M.R. 3 (1969). But see United States v. Watson, 6 Cr. L. Rep. 2377 (1970); Moylan v. Laird, 305
F. Supp. 551 (D.R.I. 1969).
41. United States v. Beeker, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 563, 565,40 C.M.R. 275, 277 (1969).
42. United States v. Morley, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 179, 43 C.M.R. 21 (1970). The Army Court of
Military Review has found military jurisdiction over the offense of wrongful importation of
marihuana where the serviceman placed it in a package and mailed it from a military post to the
United States. United States v. Skelton, C.M. No. 420559,41 C.M.R. 532 (1969). But see United
States v. Pieragowski, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 508, 42 C.M.R. 110 (1970); United States v. Tripp, 19
U.S.C.M.A. 509, 42 C.M.R. 111 (1970); United States v. Hughes, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 510,42 C.M.R.
112 (1970).
[Vol. 1971:413
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss3/3
COURT-MARTIAL JURISDICTION
covered matters affecting military security. In two cases involving an
espionage conspiracy with Soviet agents, the Court of Military Appeals
upheld court-martial jurisdiction. 3 The cases were based on the same
incident and involved an agreement to transfer copies of military
documents which were "immediately connected with the operation of the
military establishment."" Also included within this area were cases
involving the uttering of disloyal statements which also have been held to
be "service connected". 45
g. Petty Offenses. The seventh and final area in which O'Callahan
has not been applied by military courts is that of "petty offenses", i.e.,
those offenses for which the accused would not be entitled to a grand jury
indictment and jury trial in the civilian community. 4" Therefore, by being
tried by a court-martial, the accused would lose no rights which
O'Callahan sought to guarantee. 47
The cumulative effect of the numerous decisions of the Court of
Military Appeals established, at least for the military, a reasonably
circumscribed area in which court-martial jurisdiction could be validly
assumed. The promulgation of the military progeny of O'Callahan left
almost no gray areas. The penumbra of court-martial jurisdiction was
definitely cast over the seven types of factual situations described
above."'
In the same time frame in which the Court of Military Appeals
promulgated such a substantial amount of interpretive law on
O'Callahan, the lower civilian courts were relatively silent. The few
reported cases4' reveal no particular rule of thumb, save perhaps a trend
somewhat similar to that expounded by the Court of Military Appeals.
Throughout this entire period, people vitally concerned with the military
justice system were continually seeking further review and
clarification--or even an overruling-by the Supreme Court.5°
43. United States v. Harris, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 596, 40 C.M.R. 308 (1969); United States v.
Safford, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 33,41 C.M.R. 33 (1969).
44. United States v. Harris, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 596, 597,40 C.M.R. 308,309 (1969).
45. United States v. Daniels, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 529, 42 C.M.R. 131 (1970); United States v.
Harvey, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 539,42 C.M.R. 141 (1970).
46. United States v. Sharkey, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 26,41 C.M.R. 26 (1969).
47. Id.
48. See text accompanying notes 10-45 supra.
49. See, e.g., Silvero v. Chief of Naval Air Basic Training, 428 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1970); Harris
v. Ciccone, 417 F. 2d 479 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1078 (1970); Latney v. Ignatius, 416
F. 2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
50. Everett, O'Callahan v. Parker-Milestone or Millstone for Military Justice?, 1969 DuKE
L.J. 835, 875 n. 93, 896.
Vol. 1971:413]
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II1. APPLICATION OF "SERVICE CONNECTION" RULE
After the O'Callahan decision more than one and one-half years
passed before the Supreme Court again considered the issue of court-
martial jurisdiction, and applied the O'Callahan ruling to a situation in
which there were critically differentiating facts. By a vote of 9-0, Mr.
Justice Blackmun, speaking for the Court in Relford v. Commandant,
U.S. Disciplinary Barracks,51 delineated an area in which court-martial
jurisdiction was appropriate and permissible. 2 The language of the
decision, the vote of the Court, and the general thrust of the meaning to
the military system of justice requires an examination and discussion of
the various facets of the Relford decision.
In early October, 1961, a fourteen year-old sister of a serviceman was
abducted at knife-point while she waited in an automobile parked at the
Fort Dix hospital. The girl was subsequently raped by her abductor. Her
assailant was dressed in civilian clothes.
Several weeks later, the wife of an Air Force man stationed at nearby
McGuire Air Force Base was driving from her home on the base to
another base facility, the P-X, where she worked. Her assailant dressed
in civilian clothes, jumped in her car at a stop sign and forced her at
knife-point to drive to a desolate training area of Fort Dix, where she
was raped.
That same day, Corporal Isiah Relford, a member of the United
States Army and stationed at Fort Dix, New Jersey, was apprehended
and charged with kidnapping and rape. Based upon his confession made
immediately after apprehension, the accused, Relford, was also charged
with rape and kidnapping of the fourteen year-old girl.
In December of 1961, Relford was convicted of the charges of rape
and kidnapping in violation of Articles 12013 and 134,11 respectively, of
51. 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
52. Id.
53. Rape is proscribed in the UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 120 (a):
Any person subject to this chapter who commits an act of sexual intercourse with a female
not his wife, by force and without her consent, is guilty of rape and shall be punished by
death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.
54. Kidnapping is not specifically proscribed in the UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE.
Therefore, it is charged under the general article, Article 134:
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects to the prejudice
of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit'
upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this
chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general, special, or summary, court-
martial, according to the nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the
discretion of that court.
(Vol. 1971:413
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the Uniform Code of Military Justice. His sentence was total forfeitures,
reduction to the lowest enlisted grade, and death. On initial review by the
convening authority,5 5 the death sentence was affirmed, but this was
subsequently reduced to thirty years confinement at hard labor when the
case was reviewed by the Army Board of Review.5" The United States
Court of Military Appeals denied Relford's petition for grant of
review .57
While in confinement at the United States Disciplinary Barracks 8 at
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Relford sought habeas corpus relief in the
local federal district court. His supplications for relief were based on his
alleged inadequate representation by counsel at trial. Relief was denied;
on appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.59 No claim was
made at either the district court or the appellate level that the court-
martial which convicted him lacked jurisdiction because the offenses
were unrelated to his military status.60 Relford's subsequent petition for
a writ of certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court on February 27,
1979.61
Relford contended, as indeed he was forced to by the very nature of the
case, that court-martial jurisdiction should exist only to adjudicate
alleged violations of uniquely military codes of conduct (e.g.,
disobedience of orders, absence without proper authority, desertion,
misbehavior before the enemy, etc.) and that, as to other types of
55. The convening authority is the commanding officer who convenes the court, refers the case to
trial, and makes the initial review of the trial record, including findings and sentence. See
generally MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES 5, 33, 35, 84-89 (Rev. ed. 1969).
56. This tribunal is now known as the Court of Military Review, P.L. 90-632, § 2(27), 82 Stat.
1341 (1968).
57. 14 U.S.C.M.A. 678 (1963). The Court of Military Appeals has a discretionary power in
determining which cases it will review, somewhat similar to that exercised by the United States
Supreme Court. See UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTIcE, art. 67.
58. The United States Disciplinary Barracks is the official military penitentiary for prisoners of
the United States Army and the United States Air Force. See generally "Installations-United
States Disciplinary Barracks," A.R. 210-170 (10 April 1964).
59. 409 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1969). At neither the federal district court nor the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals did Relford raise the issue of court-martial jurisdiction for lack of service
connection. The errors alleged at the lower level consisted of alleged inadequacy of counsel,
improper lineup and involuntary confession. Each of these arguments was rejected. 409 F.2d at 824-
25.
60. The Supreme Court's opinion in O'Callahan had not yet been published when Relford's
decision by the Tenth Circuit was issued. However, the O'Callahan issue had been raised in
O'Callahan's lower court proceedings; see U.S. ex rel. O'Callahan v. Parker, 390 F.2d 360, 363-64
(3rd Cir. 1968), rev'd., 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
61. Brief for Government at I, Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
Vol. 1971:413]
Washington University Open Scholarship
422 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
offenses, even those committed on a military reservation, the military's
interest should be limited to the power to arrest the suspect and turn him
over to civilian authorities.12 In reply, the government argued that
O'Callahan itself recognized courts-martial jurisdiction encompassed
more than pure military violations by its emphasis on the different
factual factors which established lack of service connection.A In
disputing the argued restriction of the military solely to the power of
arrest, the government relied on the constitutional power invested in
Congress "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval Forces" 64 and argued that "'Government and
Regulation' necessarily carr[ied] with them the power to punish and not
simply the power to arrest an accused. '6 5 The emphasis in Relford was
clearly the on-post aspects of the crimes. The Government urged that the
Court adopt a principle that court-martial jurisdiction would attach to
any on-post crime against the person or against tangible property, i.e.,
those crimes which directly implicated the physical security of the
military reservation.66 In spite of the request by some commentators that
O'Callahan be overruled at the earliest possible moment, 7 the Supreme
Court in Relford made clear from the outset that it was not
reconsidering O'Callahan, but was merely applying it to the facts in
Relford.68 In its opinion, the Court laid great stress on the precise facts
of O'Callahan which supported its conclusion that a court-martial
lacked jurisdiction over that offense.69 Twelve factors from O'Callahan
were then abstracted as significant determiners of court-martial
jurisdiction. 70 Those factors were then applied to the facts in Relford.
62. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971). This also was the
position of the appellant at the oral argument which the author personally attended.
63. Brief for Government at 16-17.
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
65. Brief for Government at 18.
66. Id.
67. See. e.g., Everett, O'Callahan v. Parker-Milestone or Millstone for Military Justice?,, 1969
DuKE L.J. 835, 896.
68. 401 U.S. at 360.
69. Id. at 365. In O'Callahan, the accused was on an evening pass, off-post and in civilian
clothes. He entered a downtown hotel where he broke into the room of a young girl and attempted to
rape her. He was subsequently arrested by civilian authorities who, upon learning his military
status, released him to the military police. 395 U.S. 258, 259-60 (1969).
70. 401 U.S. at 365. Mr. Justice Blackmun abstracted the following factors from O'Callahan
which indicated, in that case, a lack of sufficient service connection to warrant an exercise of court-
martial jurisdiction:
1. The serviceman's proper absence from the base.
2. The crime's commission away from the base.
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While some of the factors present in O'Callahan were also present in
Rel]ord,71 there were significant factors which differentiated the two
cases. Unlike the facts in O'Callahan, in this case
Relford was not absent from the base;
-the crimes were committed on the military enclave;
-the second victim, because of her duties at the post exchange and
because her abduction and subsequent attack took place as she was
returning to the PX at the end of a short and approved break in her
work, was engaged in the performance of a duty relating to the military;
the security of two women properly on the post was threatened and,
indeed, their persons were violated.72
Further distinguishing the two situations were additional factors which
were present in Relford but absent in O'Callahan. In Relford, one victim
was a sister of a serviceman stationed at the base and the other victim
was the wife of a serviceman who had quarters at the base.73 Also, two
automobiles, properly on base, were unlawfully entered. 74
Although admitting that the O'Callahan decision and its application
in Relford necessarily produced an ad hoc approach to the problem, 75 the
3. Its commission at a place not under military control.
4. Its commission within our territorial limits and not in an occupied zone of a foreign
country.
5. Its commission in peacetime and its being unrelated to authority stemming from the war
power.
6. The absence of any connection between the defendant's military duties and the crime.
7. The victim's not being engaged in the performance of any duty relating to the military.
8. The presence and availability of a civilian court in which the case can be prosecuted.
9. The absence of any flouting of military authority.
10. The absence of any threat to a military post.
II. The absence of any violation of military property. One might add still another factor
implicit in the others:
12. The offenses' being among those traditionally prosecuted in civilian courts.
7 1. It is at once apparent that elements 4, 5, 8, 11, and 12, and perhaps 5 and 9, operate in
Relford's favor as they did in O'Callahan's: The offenses were committed within the
territorial limits of the United States; there was no connection between Relford's military
duties and the crimes with which he was charged; courts in New Jersey were open and
available for the prosecution of Relford; despite the Vietnam conflict we may assume for
present purposes that the offenses were committed in peacetime and that they were unrelated
to any problem of authority stemming from the war power; military authority, directly at
least, was not flouted; the integrity of military property was not violated; and the crimes of
rape and kidnapping are traditionally cognizable in the civilian courts.
401 U.S. at 366.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 366-67.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 369.
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Court, nevertheless, did enunciate a number of factors which would
support court-martial jurisdiction, and which could be applied to any
factual situation. The result has been that, in light of the O'Callahan and
Reford decisions, and in light of the decisions of the Court of Military
Appeals, 7 the military justice system has been accorded a number of
indices which can be used in determining Whether court-martial
jurisdiction should be assumed in a particular case.77 In all, the court
listed nine factors which were stressed as supporting court-martial
jurisdiction in Relford:
(a) The essential and obvious interest of the military in security of
persons and of property on the military enclave.78
Even Relford conceded the validity of this basic interest.7" The
government had strongly urged this point in its brief.8 0 Indeed, this basic
interest is so clear that it needs little discussion. The important point is
that the Court was willing to upgrade this military interest in security of
persons and property into support for judicial action with respect to
violations of that security. The military's interest in the security of
persons and property would not have been decreased if their power had
been limited to that of arrest, as the petitioner contended. Of course, this
factor, by the very nature of the Relford decision, would never be the sole
factor in sustaining court-martial jurisdiction. The reason is that several
other factors which were relied upon would always be present. One of
these ever present factors was the second:
(b) The responsibility of the military commander for maintenance of
order in his command and his authority to maintain that order."'
This, in effect, sustained the government's position that the ability of the
commander to carry out his military mission would be jeopardized if he
were not able to follow up his arrests with prosecutorial proceedings
76. See text accompanying notes 11-47 supra.
77. Of course, there is still of necessity a small gray area in which court-martial jurisdiction is not
clearly determined. "O'Callahan marks an area, perhaps not the limit, for the concern of the civil
courts and where the military may not enter. The case today marks an area, perhaps not the limit,
where the court-martial is appropriate and permissible. What lies between is for decision at another
time." 401 U.S. at 369.
78. Id. at 367.
79. Brief for Petitioner at 9.
80. Brief for Government at 15.
81. 401 U.S. at 361. See also Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886 (1961); United States v. Jelinski, 411 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 943
(1969).
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which, if successful, would result in disciplinary action being applied to
the serviceman. 82 As was noted with respect to the first factor, the
importance in the Court's stating this factor was that it translated what
might be termed as an essentially military police8 function into a reason
for sustaining military jurisdiction over persons who are arrested
pursuant to the exercise of that police function.
The third factor listed by the Court is perhaps least supportable by
legal precedent or other authority, but most supportable by common
sense:
(c) The impact and adverse effect that a crime committed against a person
or property on a military base, thus violating the base's very security, has
upon morale, discipline, reputation and integrity of the base itself, upon
its personnel and upon the military operation and the military mission."
At almost every military installation, a substantial number of military
personnel also reside in government quarters on the base. Crimes
occurring on the base, particularly those crimes affecting persons or
tangible property, cannot help but have a detrimental effect on the
morale of those residing there. This is particularly true if the base is
located in an area in which civilian prosecution of offenses occurring on
military reservations is either lax or arbitrary." Moreover, rampant and
uncontrolled crime would have an adverse effect on the reputation of the
installation. Finally, crimes against persons and tangible property
occurring on the base would adversely reflect on the commander whose
acknowledged duty is to secure the safety of the persons living there.
Necessarily, all cases concerning the jurisdiction of a court-martial
must have their starting point with Article I, Section 8, Clause 14. In
O'Callahan, the clause was interpreted to mean that status alone was not
sufficient to sustain court-martial jurisdiction; the offense must be
"service connected". 86 In Relford that same clause was further
interpreted as significantly supporting court-martial jurisdiction over
offenses which take place on a military base and are perpetrated against
82. Brief for Government at 15.
83. "Military police" is used in a broad connotation in the text. It has not been used in the
limited sense that would normally apply to the Military Police branch of the United States Army.
84. 401 U.S. at 361.
85. See text accompanying notes 90-91 infra.
86. 395 U.S. at 271-73. Dissenting in O'Callahan, Mr. Justice Harlan stressed that the "Court
has consistently asserted that military 'status' is a necessary and sufficient condition for the exer-
cise of court-martial jurisdiction." 395 U.S. at 275 (emphasis in original).
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individuals who are lawfully on that base. This was enunciated in the
Court's fourth factor:
(d) The conviction that Article I, Section 8, Clause 14, vesting in the
Congress the power "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation
of the land and naval Forces", means in appropriate areas beyond the
purely military offense, more than the mere power to arrest a serviceman-
offender and turn him over to the civil authorities. The term
"Regulation" itself implies, for those appropriate cases, the power to try
and punish. 7
Herein lies one of the most important pronouncements in Relford.
Presumably, the Court has thus ended arguments theretofore advanced
that the military's interest in security of the base and safety for the
personnel should be limited to the power to arrest and turn the suspect
over to civilian authorities."8 While certain gray areas still exist between
O'Callahan and Relford, this factor makes sufficiently clear that, within
the foreseeable future, the military will not be divested of court-martial
jurisdiction over all offenses which are not peculiarly military type
offenses.8 9 Of course, as both Supreme Court decisions make doubly
clear, the offense, even though not a violation of a uniquely military
duty, still must have sufficient nexus to the military in order to sustain
jurisdiction. Inferentially implied by the Court's pronouncement is
that even though the Supreme Court has been somewhat reconstituted
since the promulgation of O'Callahan," it will be extremely reluctant to
reconsider the basic tenets of that decision.
The practical implications that often support interpretations of
constitutional language also emerge in the Relford decision. The pithy
language of the Constitution sustains its flexibility by its ability to evolve
different meanings to meet the challenges of the times. This is certainly
true for the interpretation of the relevant constitutional clause in
Relford. This is implicit in the Court's fifth factor:
(e) The distinct possibility that civil courts, particularly nonfederal
courts, will have less than complete interest, concern and capacity for all
87. 401 U.S. at 361.
88. The petitioner urged this position at the oral argument.
89. See text accompanying notes 62-66 supra.
90. Concurring with Mr. Justice Douglas in O'Callahan were Chief Justice Warren and Justices
Black, Brennan and Marshall. Of that majority, all but the Chief Justice, who has since retired,
concurred with the opinion of Mr. Justice Blackmun in Relford. New members of the Court who
were not present for O'Callahan include the new Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun.
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the cases that vindicate the military's disciplinary problems within its own
community.'
This factor is aimed solely at the practical problems of the military if
Relford had ruled against court-martial jurisdiction. For example, if
offenses occurring on-post by servicemen were thrust into the civilian
courts, the practical result might be inadequate prosecution and a
dissipation of discipline on the military post. This result could easily be
caused if some local civilian prosecuting attorneys felt that their present
workload was so high that they could not add to it by prosecuting
servicemen for crimes occurring on a military base. This reflects the not
uncommon attitude that if an offense is committed by a serviceman on a
military installation, let the military worry about trying him. This last
fact is a very important and significant reason why court-martial
jurisdiction should be sustained for reasons unrelated to the pure
questions of law surrounding court-martial jurisdiction.
The sixth factor elicited in Relford really abstracts the positive
implications of O'Callahan. Mr. Justice Douglas's opinion set out a
myriad of factors to be used in future ad hoc judicial determinations of
"service connection". In O'Callahan all the factors tended away from
service connection-the accused was on leave, off-post, and in civilian
clothing; the crime was committed against a civilian. In Relford, the
same factors supported service connection-the accused was on base
when the crime was committed; the victims were properly on base since
one was a wife and the other was a sister of a serviceman either stationed
or living at the base.92
(f) The very positive implication in O'Callahan itself, arising from its
emphasis on the absence of service connected elements there, that the
presence of factors such as geographic and military relationships have
important contrary significance.
3
In other words, that O'Callahan relied on so many factors-such as
distance from post and military relationships-indicates that if those
factors were not present, O'Callahan itself would uphold court-martial
jurisdiction. This is in silent accord with Mr. Justice Blackmun's
opening restrictive acknowledgement, i.e., Relford was concerned only
with the application of O'Callahan, not with its reconsideration.
The next factor amplifies earlier Court language which had heretofore
91. 401 U.S. at 366.
92. See text accompanying notes 67-72 supra.
93. 401 U.S. at 366.
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been restricted to a footnote in the majority opinion in O'Callahan4 and
to the dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan.95 This is the significance
of the victim's relationship to the military and of the nearness of the
commission of the offense to a military installation as relating, to the
validity of the assumption of court-martial jurisdiction:
(g) The recognition in O'Callahan that, historically, a crime against the
person of one associated with the post was subject even to the General
Article. The comment from Winthrop ". . . certainly so indicates and
even goes so far as to include an offense against a civilian committed
'near' a military post."96
In comparing this factor with the guidelines established by the Court of
Military Appeals,97 it becomes evident that the Supreme Court perhaps
enlarged the penumbra of court-martial jurisdiction over that permitted
by the highest military court. In United States v. Rego,9" the Court of
Military Appeals had upheld the underlying principle that offenses
perpetrated against fellow servicemen are, ipsofacto, service connected.
However, this holding was by a divided court and subject to continual
assault.99 The specific reference to that principle by the Supreme Court
in a 9-0 decision will certainly solidly entrench the principle in the
military, i.e., that offenses committed against fellow servicemen are per
se service connected. The other important aspect in the Court's
delineation of this point is its statement that the basic Winthrop
authority "even goes so far as to include offenses against a civilian
committed 'near' a military post."' 0 Quoting that language from
94. 395 U.S. at 274 n. 19.
95. Id. at 278-79.
96. 401 U.S. at 367. The quotation from Winthrop is as follows:
Thus, such crimes as theft from or robbery of an officer, soldier, post trader, or
campfollower. . . inasmuch as they directly affect military relations and prejudice military
discipline, may properly be-as they frequently have been-the subject of charges under the
present Article. On the other hand, where such crimes are committed upon or against
civilians, and not at or near a military camp or post, or in breach or violation of a military
duty or order, they are not in general to be regarded as within the description of the Article,
but are to be treated as civil rather than military offenses.
W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS, 723-24 (2d ed. 1896) (footnotes omitted).
97. See text accompanying notes 11-47 supra.
98. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 9,41 C.M.R. 9 (1969); United States v. Camacho, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 11, 41
C.M.R. 11 (1969).
99. 19 U.S.C.M.A. at 10, 41 C.M.R. at 10. See also United States v. Lovejoy, 20 U.S.C.M.A.
18,42 C.M.R. 210 (1970); United States v. Cook, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 13,41 C.M.R. 13 (1969); United
States v. Plamondon, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 22, 41 C.M.R. 22 (1969); United States v. Nichols, 19
U.S.C.M.A. 43,41 C.M.R. 43 (1969); United States v. Everson, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 70,41 C.M.R. 70
(1969).
100. 401 U.S. at 368.
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Winthrop approvingly--indeed, including it as one of the nine factors
which the Court stressed"'-certainly establishes a basis for a small
enlargement of court-martial jurisdiction. For example, in a recent case
decided prior to the Relford decision by the Court of Military Appeals,
United States v. Synder,02 the accused, a member of the United States
Army, was convicted of involuntary manslaughter (child beating). The
victim was the serviceman's own child, i.e., a military dependent.
Admittedly, the actual beatings occurred off-post; however, the victim
died at the military hospital and, presumably, the serviceman's living
quarters were somewhat proximate to the military base. The Court of
Military Appeals concluded that there was no jurisdiction. It seems
reasonable to argue that a different result would obtain if the Snyder
case were decided after Relford. This argument is bolstered by the fact
that the Snyder situation also fits into factors earlier discussed, i.e.; the
distinct possibility that civil courts might have less than a complete
interest in that type of situation,10 3 and the victim was a dependent of a
serviceman. 04 Another example in which court-martial jurisdiction
might be validly assumed under this particular Relford factor, where it,
presumably, would not have attached under earlier decisions, is the
following: Sergeant Smith completes his normal duty day and, before
leaving the military installation, changes into civilian clothing.
Immediately upon departing the base, he walks across the street and
hitches a ride from a passing motorist. Upon being picked up, he pulls a
pistol out of his coat and forces the driver to proceed to a desolate area
where the serviceman robs him and steals the car, leaving the victim
stranded. The earlier decisions of the Court of Military Appeals would
not have sustained court-martial jurisdiction. However, the Supreme
Court's use of the entire Winthrop quotation, 0 5 and its indication, with
no disapproval, that the principle would go "so far as to include an
offense against a civilian committed 'near' a military post"'"6 seems to
dictate a contrary result. Thus, this factor enunciated by the Supreme
Court will not only completely sustain the guidelines constructed earlier
by the military courts, but also will provide a basis for an enlargement of
101. Id. at 367. The Court prefaced its list of factors supporting court-martial jurisdiction with
the words "We stress". The fact that the Court stressed the factors further enlarges the significance
of each of the factors.
102. 20 U.S.C.M.A. 102, 42 C.M.R. 294 (1970).
103. See text accompanying notes 90-91 supra.
104. See text accompanying notes 71-73 supra.
105. See note 96 supra.
106. 401 U.S. at 368.
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offenses to which court-martial jurisdiction can legitimately attach.
The eighth factor listed by the Court is a declaration that O'Callahan
would be entirely misread if it was interpreted to mean that the
military's authority should be restricted to that of "arrest power" for all
offenses which were not peculiarly military:
(h) The misreading and undue restriction of O'Callahan if it were
interpreted as confining the court-martial to the purely military offenses
that have no counterpart in nonmilitary criminal law.107
This is intertwined with the Court's earlier reasoning that the
Constitution vested in Congress the power to permit the military to try
offenders and not merely to arrest them and turn them over to civil
authorities. 08 This point had been strongly presented by the government
in its brief and in its oral argument." 9 This point was deservedly written
several times in different ways in the opinion, for it was the very premise
upon which the entire Re/ford case turned. For Re/ford to be decided the
other way, the crucial point would have been a ruling by the Supreme
Court that the military had only the power to arrest suspects of offenses
which were not peculiarly military offenses. If the petitioner had ever
conceded that the military had jurisd.iction to try some civilian type
offenses and that the issue in his case was merely whether his offenses
were service connected, Relford would have been summarily out of
court. His offenses had so many "service connections" that by almost
any rule he would still be subject to court-martial jurisdiction.
Therefore, the importance of the decision, vis-a-vis this factor, was
twofold: (1) the Court summarily refused to deny the military the power
to prosecute servicemen for offenses which were not purely military in
nature; (2) the Court, by its vote and by its language, significantly
solidified and defined the concept of service connection.
The final factor in the Re/ford decision will lay to rest arguments
which have been recurring, albeit unsuccessfully,"' in the military. This
is the argument that nonmilitary areas of a military reservation, e.g.,
residential living quarters, provide a basis to conclude that there is no
service connection. The corollary argument has been that if a serviceman
commits a crime in off-duty hours, there also should be no service
107. Id.
108. See text accompanying notes 62-66 supra.
109. Brief for Government at 17-18.
110. See, e.g., United States v. Dale, C.M. No. 421584, - C.M.R. - (April 2, 1971).
[Vol. 1971:413
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss3/3
COURT-MARTIAL JURISDICTION
connection. The death knell sounded quickly for these arguments:
(i) Our inability appropriately and meaningfully to draw any line
between a post's strictly military areas and its nonmilitary areas, or
between a serviceman-defendant's on-duty and off-duty activities and
hours on the post."'
After setting out these nine factors noted above, the Court went directly
to its holding in the case:
[W]e . . . hold, that when a serviceman is charged with an offense
committed within or at the geographical boundary of a military post and
violative of the security of a person or of property there, that offense may
be tried by a court-martial. Expressing it another way: a serviceman's
crime against the person of an individual upon the base or against
property on the base is "service-connected" within the meaning of that
requirement in O'Callahan. "2
As with any decision by the Supreme Court an effort was made to
restrict the decision to a narrow holding, i.e., limiting it to the facts
present in that case. However, also like any other decision by the
Supreme Court, the importance of other language in the decision and the
implications of that language carry great weight in the implementation
of that decision by the lower federal and state courts. Relford will prove
no exception in this regard.
IV. UNANSWERED ISSUES AND SOME FINAL OBSERVATIONS
Although, as Mr. Justice Blackmun pointed out, the Relford decision
"should eliminate at least some of the confusion that the parties and
commentators say has emerged from O'Callahan,"' 1 3 it is also plain that
important unanswered questions still remain for determination,
hopefully by the Supreme Court in the near future. The first, of course, is
the question of whether the rule of O'Callahan should be applied
retroactively so as to invalidate convictions that became final before the
date of the O'Callahan decision. 114 The Court, in declining to decide this
I II. 401 U.S. at 369.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 370.
114. Brief for Government at 2. On July 19, 1971, a federal district judge ruled that the
O'Callahan ruling must be applied retroactively to a navy seaman's 1944 conviction for auto theft.
Fleming v. Chaffee, - F. Supp. - 9 Cr. L. Rptr. 2361 (E.D.N.Y. July 19, 1971). See also
N.Y. Times, July 21, 1971, § 1, at I, col. 5. It remains to be seen whether this view will be accepted
by other district judges or by the appellate courts.
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important question, admitted that the government had strongly urged a
resolution of the issue.1 Yet, it concluded that the issue would have to
be resolved by the Court in some future litigation. The result of this
inaction is that the rule of the Court of Military Appeals on this point
still retains its vitality. Relying on earlier Supreme Court cases which
had set the standard for determining the retroactivity of important
rulings,"' the Court of Military Appeals concluded in Mercer v. Dillon"'
that the rule announced in O'Callahan would apply only to those cases
which were "still subject to direct review on the date of that decision.""'
Thus, the law in the military is firm on this point. The arguments in
favor of only a prospective application of O'Callahan have been ably
presented elsewhere"' and require no repetition. Suffice it to say, as the
Court of Military Appeals did in Mercer, that a retroactive application
would mean that "the practical effect of voiding earlier convictions will
often be to grant immunity from prosecution as a result of State statutes
of limitations having run, witnesses having been scattered, and memories
having been taxed beyond reasonable limits.' 20
The Supreme Court expressly left the retroactivity issue undecided in
Relford. However, the issue is an important one and it will have a
profound effect on a substantial number of individuals.' It remains to
be seen whether the Supreme Court will receive a case in which that issue
is squarely presented for its final determination.
Another very important unanswered question is whether the limiting
effect on assumption of jurisdiction imposed by O'Callahan can be
115. 401 U.S.at370.
116. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967);
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 818 (1965).
117. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 264,41 C.M.R. 264 (1970).
118. Id. at 265, 41 C.M.R. at 265. See also Enzor v. United States, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 257, 43
C.M.R. 97 (1971); United States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 547,40 C.M.R. 259 (1969).
119. Everett, O'Callahan v. Parker-Milestone or Millstone for Military Justice?, 1969DUYX
L.J. 835, 886-89; Nelson & Westbrook, Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Servicemen for "Civilian
Offenses": An Analysis of O'Callahan v. Parker, 54 MINN. L. REV. I, 39-46 (1969); Rice,
O'Callahan v. Parker: Court-Martial Jurisdiction, "Service Connection", Confusion and the
Serviceman, 51 MIL. L. REv. 41, 75-79 (1970); Note, Court-Martial Jurisdiction Limited to
"Service-Connected" Case, 44 TUL. L. REV. 417, 423-24 (1970). See also Mercer v. Dillon, 19
U.S.C.M.A. 264,41 C.M.R. 264 (1970); Thompson v. Parker, 308 F.Supp. 904 (M.D.Pa.), appeal
dismissed, - F.2d - (3rd Cir. April 24, 1970).
120. Thompson v. Dillon, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 264,267,41 C.M.R. 264,267 (1970).
121. "When the ruling in O'Callahan was rendered, the Army Judge Advocate General stated
that since 1951 . . . the Army alone had court-martialed approximately 1.3 million men and
estimated that there were 450,000 courts-martial which might be invalid under O'Callahan. "Brief
for Government at 28.
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waived by an accused. It seems clear that "jurisdiction" as used in
O'Callahan is not synonymous with the traditional meaning of
jurisdiction over persons and offenses.'2 Instead, the term is more akin
to "assumption of jurisdiction" or an "exercise of jurisdiction"' by the
military over offenses which are service connected. Once the hurdle is
cleared that "service connection" is not jurisdiction in the traditional
sense, the next question is whether an accused can waive the protective
cloak of O'Callahan. Since the basic thrust of O'Callahan is the
preservation for a serviceman of the right to grand jury indictment and
jury trial-rights which themselves can be waived-it is more than
reasonable to conclude that an accused serviceman could waive the right
to be tried in a civilian court and, instead, elect to be tried by court-
martial. Chief Judge Quinn of the Court of Military Appeals voiced this
hypothesis in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Prather.24 There,
the accused was arrested by the civilian police and charged with
wrongful appropriation of an automobile, armed robbery of a service
station, and resisting arrest. Through the efforts of his civilian counsel,
he succeeded in having the civilian authorities release him (with an
informal agreement that the civilian authorities would not prosecute
him) if the military "punished" him.'2 Judge Quinn reasoned that this
was a waiver of the rights he would have had if he had been tried in the
local state court and that, therefore, the court-martial had proper
jurisdiction to try him for those offenses.' 2 ' The same argument for
waiver was presented in oral argument in Relford as part of the unsettled
waters left in the wake of O'Callahan. The Solicitor General argued that
in some instances it would be to the advantage of the serviceman if he
would waive trial by civilian authorities and consent to court-martial
jurisdiction. Suppose a black man was arrested for sexual assault upon a
white girl in a small southern rural area. Because of his strong fear of
retribution based on racial prejudice, the accused might well prefer to be
tried by a military court-martial. Permitting him to waive O'Callahan's
122. If it is concluded that "jurisdiction" within the meaning expressed in O'Callahan is the
same as the traditional concept of jurisdiction over persons and offenses, then O'Callahan must of
necessity be retroactive. "Traditionally, lack of subject-matter voids a conviction." Mercer v.
Dillon, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 264, 265, 41 C.M.R. 264, 265 (1970); see also Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S.
371 (1880).
123. Brief for Government at 31-32. Cf Mercer v. Dillon, 19 U.S.CM.A. 264, 41 C.M.R. 264
(1970); United States v. Prather, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 560,40 C.M.R. 272 (1969); United States v. King,
40 C.M.R. 1030 (AFBR),pet. denied, 40 C.M.R. 327 (1969).
124. 18 U.S.CM.A. 560,40 C.M.R. 272 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
125. Id. at 561,40 C.M.R. at 273.
126. Id. at 561-62, 40 C.M.R. at 273-74.
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penumbra of "constitutional protection" might be the only way this
particular accused could receive a fair and impartial trial. The Court of
Military Appeals has already rejected, perhaps conclusively, the concept
that the O'Callahan doctrine can be waived by a particular accused."
Although presented as an important issue in Relford, the Supreme Court
declined to speak on this issue. It is submitted that the Supreme Court
should take the earliest opportunity to consider this issue and resolve it
in favor of permitting an accused serviceman to waive the service
connection rule if it is in his best interest to do so. This would, of course,
necessarily include, like any waiver of a constitutionally protected right,
a showing that the waiver was made knowingly and intelligently.,,,
Mr. Justice Blackmun wrote a strong opinion in favor of court-
martial jurisdiction over offenses committed on a military reservation
which involve the violation of the security of persons or property there.9
This application of O'Callahan was expressed in a unanimous Supreme
Court opinion. It might be argued that this was a strong victory in favor
of court-iartial jurisdiction. However, it is also just as reasonable to
conclude that Relford merely stopped the erosion of court-martial
jurisdiction which had been caused by O'Callahan. Perhaps O'Callahan
,represents the high-water mark on the extent of the limitation of court-
martial jurisdiction. Relford establishes that the exercise of court-
martial jurisdiction will continue to be upheld even though the offense is
not a pure violation of a uniquely military duty.
The significance of the Relford decision does not clearly emerge from
a simple reading of the opinion. Instead, the opinion must be viewed in
light of the recent history of the Supreme Court's views on military
justice and the proper scope of its jurisdiction. In what had appeared as a
long but consistent history, the Supreme Court had continually con-
stricted the jurisdiction of courts-martial. 30 In Relford, the Supreme
127. Id.
128. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831 (1969);
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
129. The Relford decision will at least be of some benefit to military lawyers in the types of
offenses within their realm of practice. See generally Everett, O'Callahan v. Parker-Milestone or
Millstone for Military Justice?, 1969 DuKE L. J. 835, 895-96.
130. In 1955, the Supreme Court proscribed court-martial jurisdiction over discharged
servicemen in United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955). Shortly thereafter, court-
martial jurisdiction over dependents overseas was precluded under the Court's holdings in Kinsella
v. United States ex reL Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1961) and Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
Subsequently, under the decisions in McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281
(1960) and Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960), civilian employees of the military were ruled
not subject to court-martial jurisdiction. In O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), the
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Court refused to continue this trend. Instead, it held the O'Callahan
limits steadfast-and may have even increased the scope of court-
martial jurisdiction.'5 ' A second significant point is that the Relford
opinion was by a unanimous Court. Whereas the O'Callahan opinion
was scarred with inflammatory accusations in both the majority and
dissenting opinions, 32 the Relford decision, issued less than two years
later, reflected an unexpected concordant opinion on the proper scope of
military jurisdiction. While it may be argued that the facts in Relford
made its result highly predictable under O'Callahan, this view has merit
only on hindsight. Until the announcement of the opinion, the result was
highly unpredictable. As one commentator observed, "[iln essence,
Relford's crime mirror[ed] O'Callahan's except for its occurrence on
post."'' In view of the pronouncements in O'Callahan downgrading the
entire military justice system,' 34 it was hardly expected that the physical
locus of the crime would necessarily determine whether the accused was
to be tried by the civilian courts which would guarantee him his
constitutional rights to grand jury and to trial by peers or whether the
accused was to be tried by court-martial which "as an institution [was]
singularly inept in dealing with the nice subtleties of constitutional
law."3 5That Relford favors court-martial jurisdiction may well reflect a
changed opinion among the members of the Supreme Court that the
military justice system does protect the individual rights of the accused.
Another significant point emanating from an examination of the Relford
opinion is that it had the effect of sub silentio sustaining the great
majority of the opinions of the United States Court of Military
Supreme Court denied court-martial jurisdiction over those offenses which had no "'service
connection". For a discussion of the earlier cases, see Everett, Military Jurisdiction Over Civilians,
1960 DuKE L.J. 366. For a criticism of O'Callahan see Everett, O'Callahan v. Parker-Milestone
or Millstone for Military Justice?. 1969 DuKE L.J. 835.
131. See text accompanying notes 140-41 infra.
132. Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the 5-3 majority, asserted the following barbs: "A court-
martial is not yet an independent instrument of justice but remains to a significant degree a
specialized part of the overall mechanism by which military discipline is preserved." 395 U.S. at
265. "[C]ourts-martial as an institution are singularly inept in dealing with the nice subtleties of
constitutional law. . ." Id. at 265-66. "[A] military trial is marked by the age old manifest destiny
of retributive justice." Id. Mr. Justice Harlan, in his dissenting opinion, asserted that the majority
view had "scant support" in English constitutional history and was "quite the contrary" to
relevant American history. Id. at 276. He further alleged: "Absolutely nothing in the language,
history, or logic of the Constitution justifies this uneasy state of affairs which the Court has today
created." Id. at 284.
133. Zillman, Recent Developments, 52 MIL. L. REV. 169, 175 (1971).
134. See note 133 supra.
135. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265-66 (1969). See also note 132 supra.
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Appeals.13 1 Perhaps not as momentous as the points discussed earlier,
this latter point is worth mentioning since it has the tacit effect of
promoting and endorsing the competence and integrity of that court's
pronouncements -no small fact in view of the recent number of
notorious military cases which have been or will be reviewed by it. A
final point, less important but again worthy of note, is that Relford was
decided by a Court which had undergone important changes in
composition since the O'Callahan opinion. 3 7 All the ramifications of
this last point are not yet altogether clear and they must await further
clarification in future decisions.
The Court did not, as some had urged,'3 overrule O'Callahan; it did,
however,-by what was not said-establish that the scope of
O'Callahan will not be enlarged in the near future.' On the contrary,
the language and the authorities upon which the Court relied " lend
strong support to a wider scope of service connected offenses than was
perhaps initially indicated by the O'Callahan opinion. The Court's
stress on "the status of a victim who is a military dependent is one
significant enlargement. Another enlargement might be premised on
offenses committed against civilians near a military reservation. Each of
these factors sulport a wider scope of service connected offenses.
The full meaning of O'Callahan has not yet emerged. There still must
be decided the question of retroactivity and the question of waiver of the
civilian court's jurisdiction. A propsective application of O'Callahan,
conforming to the opinion of the Court of Military Appeals in Mercer,'
would, it is submitted, result in the most equitable administration of
136. Cf. Zillman, Recent Developments, 52 MIL. L. REv. 169, 174 (1971).
137. The significance of this last factor is also dubious in view of Mr. Justice Douglas' silence in
Relford. In view of the blistering effect of a number of his statements in O'Callahan, his unvoiced
concurrence in Relford is somewhat surprising and perplexing. The changes in the Court, notably
the addition of Chief Justice Burger and Mr. Justice Blackmun, have been expected to moderate
somewhat the earlier Court decisions, particularly in the area of criminal law [e.g., Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)]. While the changed Court is often referred to as the "Burger Court", it
should be noted that the Chief Justice has specifically rejected this appellation because: "the Court
doesn't really warrant anybody's name being attached to it." Washington Post, July 6, 197 1, at A-
1, col. 2.
138. Everett, O'Callahan v. Parker-Milestone or Millstone for Military Justice?. 1969 DUKE L.
J. 835, 896 (1969).
139. Although Mr. Justice Blackmun used the term that "perhaps" neither O'Callahan nor
Relford represent the limits of civilian or court-martial jurisdiction in this area, it seems rather
clear that the two decisions of the Supreme court-martial jurisdiction in this the military courts'
opinions, have reasonably constructed workable concepts of "service connection".
140. See note 96 supra.
141. See text accompanying notes 114-19 supra.
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justice. As to waiver, the public interest in fair and impartial trials would
best be served by permitting an accused serviceman to waive the
"'benefits" of O'Callahan and elect to be tried by a military court-
martial, if he so desires. Permitting him to make the decision insures that
he will have those benefits to which he is entitled. Resolving these two
issues in the manner indicated will preserve the basic tenets of the
military justice system and will, prospectively, add further protections
for the accused.
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